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Starting from the premise that firms are distinct in terms of their capacity to create radical product innovations, the 
present paper attempts to explore how firms choose between different forms of R&D cooperation and their 
consequences for social welfare. It studies a duopolistic market, where firms have to choose between R&D 
competition, a cost sharing alliance, an information sharing alliance or an R&D cartel. The paper demonstrates that 
asymmetry has an impact on alliance choice and social welfare. With similar firms, the cost sharing alliance will be 
preferred to R&D competition or any other form of collaboration. With significant asymmetry no alliance may be 
formed. In terms of social welfare, any alliance is preferable to R&D competition and the R&D cartel is the best. Given 
this inherent contradiction between private preferences and optimal social choice, the paper provides a rationale for 
public investment in terms of science and technology parks to promote R&D cartels. 
 
 
JEL-Classification: L1, L24, L5 
 





I.  Introduction 
  While cooperation at the production and marketing stages between firms is nothing 
new, since the 1980’s it is increasingly observed that firms competing in the same market, are 
initiating alliances at the research and development (R&D) stage. This phenomenon is 
particularly significant in the knowledge-based sectors like telecommunications, 
microelectronics, new materials and biotechnology. Growing costs, increasing technological 
uncertainty and increasing complexity of commercialization of innovations are said to be 
fueling the phenomenon of R&D cooperation. Governments of developed and developing 
countries have also started investing in science and technology parks, as a means for the State 
to support entrepreneurs and innovation creation. Such trends in the science-based sectors 
have stimulated an extensive theoretical inquiry on the incentives for inter-firm cooperation 
and the rationality of public investment. However, most of the literature examining the 
optimal mode of cooperation at the R&D level considers only symmetric firms. Clearly, the 
assumption of homogeneous firms is unrealistic, especially in emerging or fast evolving 
markets shaped by innovation (e.g. biotechnology, nanotechnology), where firm growth is 
conditioned by firm specific technological capability. Therefore, starting from the premise 
that firms are distinct in terms of their capacity to create innovations, the present paper 
attempts to explore how firms choose between different forms of R&D cooperation and their 
consequences for social welfare.  
   The two main questions examined in the economics literature on R&D collaboration 
are: when should firms initiate R&D collaboration instead of in-house investment? How can 
firms ensure that an R&D alliance will be successful given informational problems? While the 
first question is addressed by standard industrial organization models of competition and 
cooperation, the second question is more tackled by incomplete contract theory and 
transactions cost theory models (see Veugelers [1998]; and Sena [2004] for surveys). 
Naturally, a third complementary question, namely with which partner a firm should initiate 
R&D cooperation, becomes redundant when considering only symmetric firms.  
  In the strategic management literature, however, starting with the writings of Penrose 
[1959] who posited that the growth of firms is conditioned by their particular inherent 
resources and a desire to exploit these more fully, there has been a greater recognition of firm 
heterogeneity. A rich tradition of literature on strategic management has been built on this 
perspective to predict the strategies that firms would employ for growth and their impact on 
the core competencies of firms. In terms of R&D collaboration, this strand of literature has 
mainly examined the tradeoffs between buying technology from the market vs. creating  
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innovation in-house or collaboration (see Caloghirou, Ioannides and Vonortas [2003] for 
survey).  
  Returning to the first central question examined in the industrial organization 
literature, the four most examined organizational modes for R&D investment are: (i) R&D 
competition, when firms decide on R&D investment independently; (ii) RJV or research joint 
venture, when firms share information but decide on R&D investment independently; (iii) 
R&D cost coordination or cost sharing, when firms coordinate or/and share the costs of R&D 
investment and (iv) R&D cartel, when firms coordinate to share costs and information so that 
the profit of the group is maximized. Stimulated by the seminal papers of Arrow [1962], Katz 
[1986], D’Aspremont and Jacquemin [1988] and Kamien, Muller and Zang [1992], there 
exists an extensive literature that has examined the impact of knowledge spillovers in a 
variety of contexts, such as with deterministic R&D, stochastic R&D, different degrees of 
market competition, different configurations of production costs, varying degrees of 
efficiency of R&D in the creation of product or process innovations (see Cabon-Dhersin and 
Ramani [2005] for survey). They yield two central results, which hold in markets with 
symmetric firms. First, when spillovers are high, R&D cooperation is more beneficial than 
R&D competition for both firms and society. Second, of the three modes of cooperation the 
R&D cartel yields the highest payoff for both firms and society. 
  With respect to consideration of asymmetric firms, there are a number of papers that 
show how heterogeneity can emerge given ex ante homogeneous firms in the context of R&D 
investment. Mill and Smith [1996] relate non-convexity in technology choices to uncertainty 
about demand or costs; while Amir and Wooders [1999] show that one-way spillovers can 
lead to different R&D investments among firms as a function of R&D costs and degree of 
spillovers and finally Van Long and Soubeyran [1999] demonstrate that if a mean preserving 
increase in the variance of the distribution of unit production costs can increase the profit of 
the group through differential R&D spreading, then asymmetry can also emerge. Other 
authors like Petit and Tolwinski [1999] and Kamien and Zang [2000] base their analysis on 
the assumption that a firm’s potential for innovation depends not only on its current 
investment in R&D but also its accumulated R&D investment over time. In the former model, 
different R&D investment leads to different production costs, and while R&D cooperation 
leading to lower prices is beneficial for social welfare, R&D alliances may not be formed if 
firms are very heterogeneous and the impact on magnitude of R&D investment is difficult to 
predict. In the latter model, firms choose their “absorptive capacity” to learn from spillover- 
  4
pools and also their ability to contribute to spillover-pools such that R&D collaboration 
generates sufficiently high spillovers and makes cooperation the attractive option.  
  A second stream has studied the presence of asymmetric strategies within R&D 
alliances formed of symmetric firms in terms of opportunism, where firms do not respect their 
commitments in terms of R&D effort or do not truthfully reveal some information pertinent to 
the alliance.  Some models resolve the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection by the 
formulation of revelatory mechanisms and complete optimal contracts that render cooperation 
attractive (Gandal and Scotchmer [1993]; Morash [1995]. Others like Pérez-Castrillo and 
Sandonis [1997] and Bhattacharya, Glazer and Sappington [1992] attack the moral hazard 
problem through the formulation of appropriate reward and punishment mechanisms. 
Veugelers and Kesteloot [1996] consider firms engaged in cost reducing R&D, which could 
be asymmetric in terms of production costs, R&D investment and absorptive capacities but 
are symmetric in terms of opportunism. They find that asymmetries are important for 
successful joint ventures because when synergy yields are high, unequal bargaining shares 
compensate for incentives to cheat. Without attempting to eliminate opportunism, Chaudhuri 
[1999] also considers asymmetry in terms of cost of making the R&D effort and shows that 
increase in a mean preserving spread of costs can increase the probability of success as the 
more efficient firms invest more to make up for the free-riding by the less efficient firms. 
However, since this leads to lower R&D investment than outright mergers, he concludes that 
R&D collaboration is unlikely to occur if firms are very dissimilar.  
  Finally, a few papers start right from the beginning with asymmetric firms and explore 
the possibilities of R&D cooperation in the absence of adverse selection or moral hazard 
problems. Poyago-Theotoky [1997] studies an n-firm market with specialist and non-
specialist firms, where the specialist firms can improve upon some of the characteristics of the 
good through R&D and she shows that depending on the extent of quality improvement R&D 
cooperation may or may not be socially desirable. Roller et al. [2007] extend the d’Aspremont 
and Jacquemin model of collaboration in cost reducing R&D to incorporate asymmetry in 
terms of different ex-ante marginal costs of production and they show that under both Cournot 
and Bertrand competition, significant asymmetry can lead to non-formation of alliances and 
cost-sharing is imperative to providing an incentive to collaborate. Clearly the present paper 
falls in this stream of literature with its consideration of heterogeneous technological 
capabilities ex-ante and the incentives generated consequently for R&D cooperation. 
  At the same time, our paper is distinct from others in this genre, due to three original 
features. It studies a duopoly market, where firms are endowed with specific innovation  
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capabilities, given their historical trajectories, a feature not often examined in the literature. 
Second, the innovation considered is a radical product innovation, rather than a cost reducing 
process innovation, necessitating substantial R&D outlays. Third, since radical product 
innovations usually give rise to knowledge spillovers after commercialization rather than 
during the process of innovation creation, incentives for R&D alliances are examined in the 
absence of knowledge spillovers, thereby eliminating one of the most popular explanations for 
R&D cooperation. 
  The contribution of the paper to the existing industrial organization literature on R&D 
collaboration can then be understood in terms of its five central results.  
  First, the model shows that firms which are close in terms of their technological 
capability have a greater propensity to form an R&D alliance than asymmetric firms, thereby 
confirming an observation that has been repeatedly made in the empirical literature 
(Veugelers [1998]; Miotti and Sachwald [2003]; de Man and Duysters [2005]; Lopez [2008] ) 
and in some of the theoretical papers discussed above.   
            Second, the paper confirms that in terms of R&D alliances, firms prefer to share costs 
only rather than share information only or share both costs and information. Again, it has been 
noted in several empirical analyses that cost sharing is crucial as incentive for the formation 
of R&D alliances (Miotti and Sachwald, 2003; de Man and Duysters, 2005).  
  Third, it proposes an explanation for the non-pervasiveness of R&D alliances. 
Theoretical models considering symmetric firms have shown that cooperation is beneficial to 
firms under many different situations, so that one is led to expect that cooperation at the R&D 
level will be a pervasive phenomenon. However this is not the case. Even in high tech sectors 
where R&D strategic alliances are more prevalent, cooperation at the R&D level is more the 
exception than the rule. We show that significant asymmetry in technological capabilities 
could be a cause of the problem. 
  Four, the model provides a rationale for public investment in science and technology 
parks for the hi-tech sectors. A social welfare ranking of the R&D alliances according to our 
model confirms the standard result that the R&D cartel is best for society. However, we also 
show that when firms are similar in terms of their technological capabilities, they will prefer 
to initiate a cost sharing alliance and if they are very asymmetric no R&D alliance may be 
formed at all. Therefore, in the face of such contradictions between social choice and private 
choice, public policy and investment promoting collaboration are called for.   
  Five, it also refines some standard theoretical results. For instance, an established 
result is that R&D competition yields highest payoffs to firms when spillovers are low.  
  6
However, we show that in the context studied with zero spillovers and a radical product 
innovation, although R&D competition always dominates an information sharing alliances,  
there are parameter configurations where a cost sharing alliance and an R&D cartel dominate 
R&D competition.   
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the model. Section III 
contains the results: sections III(i)-III(iv) compare payoffs from R&D competition and the 
three R&D alliances; section III(v) explains firm preferences for R&D collaboration and 
section III(vi) examines implications for social welfare. Finally, section IV concludes.   
 
II.  The Model 
Consider a firm in a hi-tech sector such as biotechnology or nanotechnology, which 
needs to invest first in the acquisition of a knowledge base in order to develop the 
technological capability to create a radical innovation, for which a potential market exists. For 
simplicity let us suppose that this investment is given by the fixed costs F,  that could 
represent recruitment of new researchers, purchase of new machinery, installation of a new 
lab etc. This gives rise to a technological capability that enables the firm to create a radical 
innovation with probability p. Furthermore, let us suppose that a technology race occurs in a 
duopolistic market, with the two firms indexed by i and j. While the firms have the same cost 
of production ex-ante, they do not have the same history or managerial vision. Therefore, the 
acquisition of the same knowledge base can give rise to different firm specific dynamic 
technological capabilities
1 given by the probabilities  i p  and  p j respectively. There are no 
spillovers or learning externalities in the market and hence the probabilities  i p  and  j p  are 





= γ (say) measures the degree of asymmetry in the 
technological competencies of the two firms. If γ = 1, the firms are symmetric and if   1 ≠ γ , 
the firms are asymmetric. In this paper, for simplicity we consider  j p pi ≥  such that γ ≥ 1 
and γ increases as the technological capabilities of the firms become more asymmetric.  
Both firms wish to acquire the knowledge base in order to attempt to create a radical 
innovation. This gives rise to a winner takes all game, such that the firm that creates the 
innovation first becomes a monopolist earning  m π . If both firms manage to create the 
innovation simultaneously, then each earns the duopoly Cournot-Nash profit of  d π .  
                                                 
1 See Athreye, Kale and Ramani (2008) for examples of this phenomenon in the Indian pharmaceutical industry.  
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  In the above context, the two firms i and j have the choice between four types of 
organization for the undertaking of the R&D project. 
i.  R&D competition: The firms do not share the R&D costs F or the R&D findings. 
ii.  Cost sharing alliance: The two firms agree upon a sharing arrangement for the fixed 
costs  F. Since knowledge can be replicated costlessly, the two firms exploit their 
knowledge input separately thereafter. Thus, in a cost sharing alliance, cost savings are 
achieved through non-duplication of the efforts required to produce the knowledge 
input at the pre-competitive stage. 
iii.  Information sharing alliance (also termed research joint venture in the literature): 
The firms invest in F separately but share their R&D findings so that the probability of 
creating the innovation is maximized. 
iv.  R&D cartel: The firms share both the cost F and the R&D findings so that there are 
cost economies and with their combined technological capabilities the probability of 
creating an innovation is maximized.  
 
Given these three possible options for R&D cooperation, in what follows, we examine 
the following questions. Under what conditions will an R&D alliance be initiated by the 
firms? For which technological competency profiles will each kind of R&D alliance be 
initiated? What is the maximum degree of asymmetry between the competencies that can be 
tolerated under the three different kinds of R&D alliances? The answers in turn permit us to 
make inferences on the role of public policy to promote innovation through collaboration. 
 
III.  Results on R&D competition and R&D alliances 
III (i).  R&D Competition 
  In the absence of collaboration, the expected profit of any firm i from undertaking 
R&D is  i
nc π = F d p j pi m p j pi − + − π π ) 1 ( . Firm i can either be the only innovator and earn 
the monopoly profit  m π  with a probability  i p (1− j p ) or both firms can be successful and 
earn the duopoly profit  d π  with a probability  i p j p . Whenever firm j alone succeeds, firm i 
is left out of the market.  
  Clearly, a firm will undertake R&D investment in the first place only if it anticipates 
earning positive payoffs. We consider two possible situations to identify the conditions under 
which R&D competition will occur. First, where the firms are symmetric in terms of their  
  8
technological capabilities, i.e.  1 = γ and second, assuming that firm i is the one with the higher 
technological capability, the context where technological capabilities are asymmetric with  
1 > γ . It can be easily shown that when  1 = γ ,  i
nc π  =πnc
j  and when  1 > γ ,  i
nc π  >πnc
j
2.  
Therefore, to identify the condition under which R&D competition can occur, i.e. when both 
firms will invest in R&D, it is sufficient to check if the less capable firm j incurs R&D 
expenditure in each of the cases. If πnc
j > 0 and firm j decides to incur the R&D expenditure, 
it must follow that firm i does likewise. This leads to our first proposition on the necessary 
conditions for R&D competition. 
 
Proposition 1a: R&D competition under asymmetric competencies with  j p p p i ≥ =  
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Proposition 1b: R&D competition under symmetric capabilities with  j i p p p = =  
  There is R&D competition only when p satisfies conditions (ii)-(iii).  
                                                 
2 From the definitions of  i
nc π and πnc
j it follows that  i
nc π − πnc
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> 1,  i
nc π − πnc
j > 0.  
  9
 
Proof: See the appendix. 
 
  Although the R&D expenditure is fixed and certain at F, the returns from such 
investment, dependent on the technological capability profile of the firms, are uncertain. 
Thus, from the outset, firm capabilities have to be above a minimal level in order to ensure 
positive returns after an outlay of F. It follows from the definition of  i
nc π  that whenever F is 
invested, either a monopoly profit  m π  can be gained or a loss of ( d m π π − ) can be incurred 
and for higher capabilities of the rival, the increase in expected loss is greater than the 
increase in expected gain. Thus, there is R&D competition only if the technological 
capabilities of both the firms are sufficiently high.  
  Another outcome is that as the R&D investment F falls, the range of capability 
profiles under which R&D competition is viable expands. When the R&D investment F is low 
enough to be sustained even under a duopoly market, i.e.  π ≤ F d , there exists a minimum 
capability level  p , such that for all  p ∈ ( p , 1) the expected return from R&D expenditure 
always exceeds the low value of F and R&D competition takes off. However, as the R&D 






− , firms with low-end capabilities and high-end 
capabilities withdraw from the R&D competition. Within this range, as F increases, the 
interval of capabilities under which R&D competition occurs,  ) ˆ ˆ , ˆ ( p p , decreases. 
Consequently, the scope of the R&D competition falls. When the required R&D outlays are 






− , no firm can undertake R&D investment and no innovation is 
created.  
  Lastly, when firm capabilities are distinct, not only do the firms have to be efficient 
but they also have to be sufficiently symmetric or close in terms of technological capabilities. 
In fact, the proposition indicates that for any given technological capability p of the more 
efficient firm, the technological capability of the less efficient firm must lie in the interval 
(
d m p p
F
π π + − ) 1 ( , p) for R&D competition to occur. Otherwise, the less efficient firm simply 
does not enter the innovation race. 
  In the remainder of the paper, in order to facilitate the comparison of payoffs under 
non-cooperation and cooperation at the R&D level, we restrict our attention in the non- 
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cooperation case to R&D competition where F is low enough i.e. F ≤  d π  
3. In particular, we 
make the following assumption for the rest of the paper
4: 
 
Assumption 1: The configuration of required R&D outlay F, market profits πm,  d π , and 
firm capabilities pi and  p j  are such that R&D competition prevails with F ≤  d π , i.e. the 
conditions (iii) of proposition 1a hold. 
 
  From proposition 1, it follows that assumption 1 ensures that both firms are capable of 
undertaking R&D investment under non-collaboration anticipating payoffs of  i
nc π  > 0 and 
πnc
j > 0 respectively. Hence, non-collaboration at the R&D level will be tantamount to the 
prevalence of R&D competition and this organizational mode is the default option if 
collaboration does not take off.  
 
III(ii).  The Cost Sharing Alliance       
  The benefit of a cost sharing alliance is that the fixed cost F can be shared between the 
firms, say as  F α  for firm i, and  F ) 1 ( α −  for firm j, where  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ α . Cost savings are 
achieved through non-duplication of efforts required to produce the knowledge input at the 
pre-competitive stage, but the probability of success at the development stage remains 
unchanged. Let us represent the payoff from a cost sharing alliance for the ith firm and the jth 
firm by the pair ( i
c π , j
c π ). Then by the above argument  F d p j pi m p j p c
i i
α π π π − + − = ) 1 (  
and  F d p j pi m pi p c
j j
) 1 ( ) 1 ( α π π π − − + − = .  
  In order to initiate a cost sharing alliance, the firms first negotiate over the cost sharing 
ratio α. A number of endogenously determined cost-sharing rules are possible. In the present 
context, given that it is a pure bargaining problem, the Nash bargaining solution with each 
                                                 
3 In some forms of collaborations like the cost-sharing alliance and the R&D cartel as the fixed cost of producing 
the knowledge input gets shared, some firms which do not participate in R&D competition may turn out to be 
willing to participate in the collaborations. Even if we consider them, their ranking over the alternative forms of 
collaboration would be the same as in the case considered in the paper and the basic results would remain 
unchanged. 







and the nature of the results remain 
unchanged.   
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firm having equal bargaining power has been considered. The disagreement payoffs are 
evidently the R&D competition payoffs  i
nc π > 0 and πnc
j > 0 (under conditions of assumption 
1). Then the cost-sharing ratio that will prevail at equilibrium is given by the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: (i) For all configurations of costs, payoff structure and technological 
capabilities, at equilibrium each firm will bear 50% of the fixed costs F.  
(ii) Whenever R&D competition is possible, a cost sharing alliance will be preferred to R&D 
competition. 
 
Proof: Applying the Nash-Bargaining solution to this context, the cost sharing ratio α emerges 
as the ratio that maximizes the product of the net gains from bargaining for the partner firms. 
In other words, maximizing [( nc
i
c
i π π − )( nc
j
c
j π π − )] with respect to α yields the cost 
sharing ratio as 
2
1
= α for all capability configurations of the two firms.  
The interesting point to note in the above exercise is that usually varying the 
disagreement points changes the outcome of the bargaining process, because the gains from 
negotiation change as the disagreement points change. However, in our case, the gains from 
negotiation, in terms of cost savings are totally independent of the disagreement points. 
Hence, the 50% share is the only ratio that satisfies the Nash bargaining solution criteria of 
equal sharing of surplus generated by the cost sharing alliance. With this ratio, the equilibrium 
payoff of the firms in the cost-sharing collaboration becomes:  
i
c π = F d p j pi m p j pi 2
1 ) 1 ( − + − π π  and  j
c π  = F d p j pi m pi p j 2
1 ) 1 ( − + − π π .                                 
 
Clearly, the two firms will participate in a cost sharing alliance only if they earn more 
than under R&D competition or the following participation constraints are satisfied:  
(1)  i
c π > i




From the definitions of   i
c π , j
c π ,  i
nc π  and πnc
j  it follows that inequalities (1) and (2) 
will hold if and only if the following inequalities hold:  
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(3)  (1– α)F > 0.  
(4)  αF > 0.  
It can be easily observed that at equilibrium, with 
2
1
= α , whatever the technological 
capabilities of the firms, under the conditions of our assumption, the participation constraints 
given by inequalities (3) and (4) are satisfied for both the firms.  
 
 
III(iii).  The Information Sharing Alliance 
In an information sharing alliance, R&D findings are shared, which means that if one 
of the firms discovers the new product, in no time the other firm can launch an almost 
identical product at the market. Thus, the new product can be launched if either of the two 
firms makes the discovery. Sharing of information at the development stage reduces the 
probability of failure in R&D, as the technological capability of the research joint venture 
becomes 1− ) 1 )( 1 ( p j pi − − =) 1 ( ) 1 ( pi p j p j pi p j pi − + + − , which is greater than either of 
the individual capabilities of the two firms  i p  or  j p  . However, if successful, both the firms 
will launch the innovation jointly in the market earning the duopoly profit,  d π . Thus, for any 
firm  i, the expected profit from an information sharing alliance is 
F d p p i
i j i − − − − = π π )) 1 )( 1 ( 1 ( . Again, an information sharing alliance will be formed only 
if both the firms can earn more than they could obtain under non-collaboration or R&D 
competition, i.e. if and only if the respective participation constraints given by πi
i >  i
nc π  and 
πi
j> πnc
j are satisfied: 
(5)  d i p j p d m p j pi π π π ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( − − − − < 0 . 







− ] <0. 
 
Under which capability configurations will the above two conditions be satisfied? This 
is revealed in the next proposition.  
  
Proposition 3: Whatever the configuration of technological capabilities of the two firms, an 
information sharing alliance will never be formed.  
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Proof: See the appendix. 
 
The intuition behind proposition 3 is as follows. Each firm considers the possibility of 
sharing information to insure itself against being thrown out of the market, in case its rival 
creates the innovation while it does not. However, there is a price for this option. By sharing 
information both firms reduce their chance of failure in the R&D competition, but by doing so 
they also completely forego the chance to capture the monopoly rent  m π . Information sharing 
leads to launching almost identical products at the market almost at the same time whereby 
each firm earns the duopoly profit  d π . From standard oligopoly theory we know  m π  > 2 d π > 
d π . Therefore, if the firms are symmetric i.e. no one has advantage over the other in R&D, 
for individual firms the opportunity cost of missing out on monopoly rent turns out to be 
greater than the expected profit from participation in the alliance even though the probability 
of failure reduces with the alliance, and hence, the alliance is not formed.  
When the firms are asymmetric, the non-formation of an information alliance can be 
explained similarly. The more capable firm is dissuaded from entering into an alliance 
because its probability to succeed is higher and it sees no point in foregoing the monopoly 
rent by forming an alliance that could lower its profit drastically. The inefficient firm in this 
situation facing the odds against its success in the R&D competition, may be willing to 
participate in the alliance as it provides an insurance against exclusion from the monopoly 
rent which is imminent, but its proposal is declined by the more capable firm. Therefore, in 
this case also, the information sharing alliance is not formed.  
  
III(iv).  The R&D Cartel 
  In an R&D cartel, with both cost and information sharing, the expected payoffs of the 
firms i and j are: πr
i  = (1− ) 1 ).( 1 ( p j pi − − ) F d α π −  and πr
j= (1− ) 1 ).( 1 ( p j pi − − ) F d ) 1 ( α π − −  
respectively. Furthermore, in the bargaining on cost sharing, the disagreement payoffs are 
i
nc π > 0, πnc
j > 0 as in the earlier two cases and the Nash Bargaining solution
5 α* emerges 
as :  
                                                 
5 Similar to the cost sharing cartel here also we assign equal bargaining power to the firms. When 
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The R&D cartel will be preferred over R&D competition, if and only if at α*, the 
participation constraint of the ith firm, πr
i >  i
nc π , and that of the jth firm, πr
j > πnc
j , are 
satisfied. In other words, an R&D cartel is formed if and only if the following inequality 
holds: 
(8)  F > (pi + pj – 2 pi pj)(  d m π π 2 − ). 
Since  m π  > 2 d π , and  pi + pj – 2 pi pj = [pi (1– pj) + pj (1– pi)] > 0, the right hand side 
of inequality (8) is positive. Moreover, we can simplify inequality (8) by assuming F = d βπ  
where β ∈ (0, 1] and rewrite the participation constraint as follows: 
 
(9)  ) 2 ( ) 2 ( d m j p i p p j pi d π π βπ − − + > . 
 
Now, we can present the criteria for the formation of an R&D cartel as follows.  
 
Proposition 4:  
(i)  An R&D cartel will always be preferred to R&D competition if the R&D outlay, F, is 
greater than the opportunity cost of forming an R&D cartel, ( π π d m 2 − ),or for 
high values of β , whatever the degree of asymmetry. 
(ii)  When F < ( π π d m 2 − )  an R&D cartel will be initiated always if firms have very 
high technological capabilities and limited asymmetry. However, for very small F 
or very low values of  β , an R&D cartel may also be formed if firms have low 
technological capabilities with limited asymmetry.  
 
Proof: See the appendix for formal presentation of proposition and the proof. 
The intuition behind the first part of the above proposition is as follows. If the fixed 
cost of R&D is high and the monopoly profit to be earned from the development of the new 
product is low, the opportunity cost of forfeiting the monopoly profit is low, while the benefit 
from sharing of the fixed cost of the knowledge input is high. Hence, an R&D cartel is more 
attractive. However, for higher monopoly profit, the cost of information sharing may 
outweigh the benefit of cost sharing, and therefore, participation in the R&D cartel may turn  
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out to be an unattractive option depending on the configuration of firm capabilities. For 
instance, if firm capabilities are not high, by sharing information, they do not lose much, as 
the probability of new discovery on their own is fairly low, and furthermore if the fixed cost 
of R&D is high, the benefit of cost sharing is also high. Therefore, low capability firms will 
prefer an R&D cartel under these conditions. On the other hand, if the firms are highly 
capable (i.e. p is in the neighbourhood of 1), in the absence of information sharing, an 
individual firm fears market exclusion as its rival could succeed with a high probability. Here 
participation in the R&D cartel provides insurance against possible market exclusion, and 
benefits from cost sharing exceed the lowering of innovation rent due to information sharing, 
leading firms to initiate an R&D cartel.  
The second part of the proposition indicates that if the technological capability of the 
relatively efficient firm itself is low and the asymmetry is limited, then the firms will form an 
R&D cartel. Other than the cost sharing advantage, an R&D cartel permits the relatively 
inefficient firm to increase its chances of success by collaborating with the more efficient 
firm. On the other hand, the more capable firm, not being too efficient itself does not lose 
much by sharing its R&D findings with the partner firm as this is compensated by gains from 
the cost sharing. Again, if both firms are very capable, then they initiate an R&D cartel to 
avoid market exclusion in the post-innovation period. 
In contrast to this, as asymmetry increases, the less capable firm is always willing to 
join the R&D cartel as it benefits from sharing information (and is otherwise likely to lose out 
in R&D competition), but the more capable firm may not agree so easily. The more capable 
firm knows that even if it does not join the R&D cartel and does not share the information, it 
will not lose much since the probability of its rival discovering the product is low and 
consequently its risk of market exclusion is also low. Therefore, an R&D cartel is not formed. 
The intuition described above is also illustrated in the following simulations. 
  
[Insert table 1 here] 
 
Table 1 presents simulations corresponding to a context where  π π d m F 2 − < . As 
can be seen, for high and low capability profiles of both firms, as long as asymmetry is 
limited, an R&D cartel dominates non-cooperation. However, there are capability profiles, 
that are in the middle ( i p =0.55 and  j p =0.3) when an R&D cartel cannot be formed because 
the more capable firm prefers to compete alone. It can also be noticed that for low  
  16
capabilities, the jth firm cannot engage in R&D competition and therefore such cases are not 
considered for comparison. 
 
III(v).  Firm choice among the R&D alliances 
So far we have compared the returns from each of the three forms of R&D cooperation 
with R&D competition and identified the conditions under which cooperation will dominate 
competition. Now, let us consider the case when the two firms come together to choose 
between R&D competition and the three forms of R&D cooperation. From propositions 1-4, 
we know that the choice will lie essentially between an R&D cartel and a cost sharing 
alliance. In fact, whenever the R&D cartel is possible, the cost sharing alliance is also 
possible, though the converse need not be true. This leads us to the question: If both an R&D 
cartel and a cost sharing alliance are possible for a firm, which would be preferred? We 
answer this question in the next proposition. 
 
Proposition 5: Given the choice between the formation of the R&D cartel and the cost sharing 
alliance, if the firms are not too asymmetric in terms of their technological capability, the cost 
sharing alliance will be preferred to the R&D cartel. If the firms are very asymmetric, then the 
less capable firm may prefer the R&D cartel to the cost sharing alliance, while the more 
capable firm will prefers the opposite. In this case no alliance will be formed
6. 
Proof: See the appendix.     
 
The intuition behind the proposition is not difficult to understand. As we discussed 
earlier, information sharing in the R&D cartel comes with a price tag, especially for the firm 
which is more capable. Therefore, the more capable firm will prefer the cost sharing alliance 
rather than an information sharing alliance. In contrast, participation in the cost sharing 
alliance involves only pure benefit to both firms. Therefore, whenever the asymmetry 
between the firms is not very high, the less capable firm will also agree to the cost sharing 
alliance if it is the only option desired by the more capable firm. However, if the 
technological capability of one of the firms is very low, then in a R&D cartel, it benefits from 
both information sharing and cost sharing and is its preferred choice. In this case, the more 
                                                 
6 In this model we have assigned equal bargaining power to all types of firm. In this situation, clearly, had the 
more inefficient firm have the greater bargaining power the R&D cartel would have been preferred to the cost 
sharing alliance.  
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capable firm, which always prefers a cost sharing alliance to an R&D cartel will have an 
opposite preference. Hence, no alliance will be formed and the two firms will continue to 
compete with each other as they were doing in the first place. 
  The proposition is also illustrated by the simulations given in table 2. 
[insert table 2] 
 
  It can be noted from table 2, that for the given configuration, when both the firm are 
equally highly capable, they prefer to initiate a cost sharing alliance. However, when there is 
significant asymmetry the more capable firm gains more from a cost sharing alliance, while 
the less capable firm prefers an R&D cartel. If both firms have equal bargaining powers, in 
this case, no alliance is likely to be initiated. 
 
III(vi)  Ranking according to Social Welfare 
          There is a widespread acceptance that the State should encourage innovation through 
promoting cooperation between firms at the R&D level. In this case, which kind of R&D 
alliance should be promoted? In other words, can we rank the alternative R&D collaborations 
that private firms can form between themselves, in terms of the social welfare generated? 
How do the social benefits from the initiation of the three R&D alliances compare with that 
from R&D competition? In this section we try to find out answers to these questions.  
             Suppose,  the  social  surplus  (defined  as  the  sum  of  the  consumer  and  the  firms’ 
surplus) is given by  m s  if a monopoly is created in the market for the new product. Similarly, 
if a duopoly is created, the social surplus is given by  d s . From standard oligopoly theory we 
know that it is always the case that  d s  >  m s . The expected social surplus of the society from 
the R&D competition is given by  
nc S  =  F sd p j p m s i p j p i sm p j pi 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − + − + − .                                                                       
Furthermore, the social surplus from the cost sharing alliance, the information sharing alliance 
and the R&D cartel are respectively given by:   
c S = F sd p j p m s i p j p i sm p j pi − + − + − ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ;  
i S  =  F sd p j p d s i p j p i sd p j pi 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − + − + − ; and: 
r S  =  F sd p j p d s i p j p i sd p j pi − + − + − ) 1 ( ) 1 ( . 
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Proposition 6: From the social welfare point of view, the R&D cartel is preferable to both the 
cost sharing alliance and the information sharing alliance. Furthermore, having any form of 
R&D alliance is better than R&D competition. 
Proof: See the appendix.  
 
Society prefers any of the three types of R&D alliances to R&D competition for either 
one or both of the following reasons: unlike in R&D competition, an R&D alliance eliminates 
duplication of fixed costs to acquire the knowledge input and any form of R&D cooperation 
creates a duopoly market for the innovation with a higher probability.  
Furthermore, from the social welfare point of view, the R&D cartel is preferable to the 
information sharing alliance because it prevents the duplication of the fixed cost of acquiring 
the knowledge input while yielding the same benefits (or costs) from information sharing. 
Similarly, even though the cost sharing rule is different in the cost sharing alliance and the 
R&D cartel, the nature of the cost sharing benefits generated by the two alliances is the same 
and in addition, in the R&D cartel, firms and society benefit from the sharing of R&D 
findings. Therefore, the R&D cartel is preferred to either of the two alternative forms of 
alliances. 
 
IV.  Conclusions 
In a comprehensive survey of R&D collaboration, Veugelers [1998] insists that 
incentives for cooperation among asymmetric firms must be studied more because “Although 
the empirical analysis provides massive evidence of asymmetries between partners, the 
theoretical work has mostly concentrated on alliances between symmetric firms”. In 
particular, firms are assumed to have the same technological capabilities, which eliminates the 
need to examine one of the fundamental problems of R&D cooperation, namely that of 
“appropriate partner selection”. Thus, in an attempt to contribute to a better understanding of 
R&D cooperation between asymmetric firms, this paper considered duopolistic firms of non-
identical technological competencies and examined the incentives for the formation of 
different kinds of R&D alliances. Firms had the option of either engaging in R&D 
competition or initiating an information sharing alliance, a cost sharing alliance or an R&D 
cartel. A set of propositions were derived comparing the profit accrued by firms from R&D 
competition and the three different kinds of R&D alliances. Then they were also ranked in 
terms of the social welfare generated. The results highlighted the role of firm-specific  
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technological capability in the choice of form of R&D cooperation and demonstrated that a 
high degree of asymmetry deters firms from entering into R&D alliances. 
The paper also yields some managerial guidelines for the initiation of R&D alliances. 
First, it advocates that an information sharing alliance should never be formed unless there are 
other public benefits, such as subvention from the government, or reputational benefits in 
terms of corporate social responsibility. Second, if the firms are not too asymmetric in terms 
of technological capabilities, a cost sharing alliance can be initiated as it will benefit both 
firms. Third, if the firms are very asymmetric, then it is better to continue with R&D 
competition as there is likely to be a conflict of preferences over of choice of R&D alliance, 
with the less capable firm favouring an R&D cartel and the more capable firm preferring the 
cost sharing alliance.   
Three policy inferences can also be made on the basis of the results of the paper. First, 
unlike in the case of symmetric firms, firm differences in technological capabilities can lead 
to contradictions between private and public rationality when it comes to choice of type of 
R&D alliance. While the model confirms one of the main results of the existing literature on 
R&D alliances, that all three forms of alliances yield greater social welfare than R&D 
competition between firms and the R&D cartel is unambiguously the best for society, it shows 
that such a choice need not be the preferred option of all firms. 
The above contradiction is most likely to occur if the competing firms are very 
asymmetric. In this case, the government should provide them with incentives to engage in 
cooperation because otherwise no alliance may be formed, which is not in the interests of 
society. For instance, there can be publicly funded R&D programs that require a joint research 
proposal drafted by a set of asymmetric collaborating organizations as a pre-requisite to 
obtaining funds. Pure information research consortiums can be promoted to generate 
innovations for life threatening problems like medicines for HIV/AIDS or malaria in the name 
of corporate social responsibility, which otherwise would not be initiated. Subventions could 
be provided for the creation of science and technology parks, which often facilitate the 
sharing of fixed costs of R&D investment necessary for innovation creation. 
Third, if the firms are sufficiently symmetric, they will form cost sharing alliance on 
their own. But, it is in the interests of society that the government ensures information sharing 
along with cost sharing. Here policies like tax benefits or access to infrastructural facilities to 
organizations in private technology parks in return for regularly sharing information among 
themselves via meetings and conferences can be considered.           
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  Finally, some empirical and theoretical extensions of the present paper can be 
envisaged. Two testable hypotheses that emerge from the paper are: (i) outside of technology 
parks, R&D alliances are more likely to be initiated among firms of similar technological 
capabilities; and (ii) among the different forms of R&D cooperation, the most prevalent will 
involve cost-sharing alone, followed by cost and information sharing and rarely pure 
information sharing. Theoretical extensions of the present paper that can also be considered 
are inclusion of variable R&D investment, spillovers and incremental quality enhancing 
innovations. Another possibility is to adapt the model to include other agents besides just 
competing firms. For instance, R&D cooperation in the high-tech sectors often involves 
public organizations as well as firms and cooperation can also be initiated between firms 
occupying different positions in the vertical product value chain (Belderbos et al. 2004a, 
2004b). 
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Proof of proposition 1a. 
Suppose, γ > 1 i.e. p = pi > pj, then  i
nc π  >πnc
j . Therefore, both firms enter into R&D 
competition if and only if πnc
j > 0. From the definition of πnc
j , it follows that this occurs if 
and only if : 
 
(A.1)   pj ∈ (
d m p p
F
π π + − ) 1 ( , p).      
Furthermore, the given interval is non-empty only if 
d m p p
F
π π + − ) 1 (  < p, which in 
turn implies: 
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Again, since  m π  >  d π , it can be easily shown that  >






  d π .  
Now we can check for R&D competition in three possible cases of R&D investment 











. Here  0 ) ( min ≥ p f and f(1)> 0. Furthermore, since f(0)>0  
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2
. Here f(0)>0,  0 ) ( min < p f and  0 ) 1 ( > f . Since f(p) is a 
continuous function over p∈ (0, 1),  there exists two capability values,  p ˆ  and  p ˆ ˆ  in the 
interval (0,1) such that  p p p ˆ ˆ ˆ min ≤ <  and for all  ) ˆ ˆ , ˆ ( p p p∈  the condition (A.2) holds. 
Furthermore, if condition A.1 holds, i.e. firm j is also competent enough to undertake R&D 
investment given the presence of firm i, there is R&D competition.   
 









. Here f(0)>0,  0 ) ( min < p f and  0 ) 1 ( ≤ f . Again, since f(p) 
is a continuous function over p∈ (0, 1),  there exists a value,  p  such that  1 min ≤ < p p   and 
for all  ) 1 , (p p∈  the condition (A.2) holds. Furthermore, if condition A.1 holds also there is 
R&D competition.   
 
Proof of proposition 1b. 
If  1 = γ , then  i
nc π  =πnc
j = π and the firms engage in R&D competition if and only if 
0 > π  or  f(p) < 0. The derivation of the conditions under which f(p) < 0 are exactly the same 
as that in the proof of 1a above and the statement of the second part of the proposition 
follows.      
 
Proof of proposition 3. Suppose,  d i p j p d m p j pi π π π ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( − − − − = π . Then the participation 
constraints given by inequalities (5) and (6) can be written as: 
(A.3)   π < 0  







− ] < 0  
When the firms are symmetric, i.e. pi = pj = p, the two inequalities (A.3) and (A.4) are 







−  = 1. Moreover from standard oligopoly theory we know 
that d m π π 2 >  and hence  0 ) 2 )( 1 ( > − − = d m p p π π π . Therefore, the inequality (A.3) can 
never hold. 







−  > 1 (refer to 
footnote 3). This means that π  can be written alternatively as:  
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− ) ( d m π π −  -  d π ]. 







−  > 1 we have π > 0 and in this case also 
inequality (A.3) can never hold. Therefore, the statement of the proposition follows.       
 
 
Proof of proposition 4.  
  Recall that when firms are symmetric with pi = pj = p,  there exists a minimum 
capability level, say  p , such that  0 ) ( = p f  and for all  ) 1 , (p p K ∈ ,  0 ) ( < p f making R&D 
competition possible. 
In this interval  ) 1 , (p K
are there any capability levels under which an R&D cartel will be 
preferred ? To answer this question, we start by noting that an R&D cartel dominates an R&D 
competition whenever inequality (8) is satisfied along with assumption 1. Then, we simplify 
inequality (8) by assuming F = d βπ  where β ∈ (0, 1] and rewrite the participation constraint 
as ) 2 ( ) 2 ( d m j p i p p j pi d π π βπ − − + > . When pi = pj = p, the preceding inequality is 
transformed into: 







+ − > 0.                                                                                                        
Defining  () p φ = 







+ − , the condition for participation in the R&D cartel in 
inequality (9) can then be rewritten as: 
 (A.6)    () p φ  > 0.  
The function  ( ) p φ  is continuous over p∈  ) 1 , (p and reaches its minimum at p= 2









φ  =  















φ  > = < 0 if and 
only if 2 d π (1 + β ) > = <  m π  or  d m F π π 2 2 − < = > . We will now examine the case of high 
costs and low costs seperately.  
 








⎛ φ . Second, since  () 0 0 > φ , 
() 0 1 > φ  and  ) (p φ  is a continuous function, it implies that  0 ) ( > p φ  for all p. Consequently,  
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for any given configuration  m F π ,  and  d π , there exists a minimum capability level,  p  such 
that in the symmetric case, R&D competition is viable for all capabilities p, such that 








j π π + −
∈ . Finally, since  0 ) ( > p φ  for all  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ p , it is the also the case 
that  () 0 > p φ  over the corresponding domains where R&D competition is possible in the 
symmetric and asymmetric cases. Hence, whenever R&D competition is viable it will be 
rejected in favour of an R&D cartel.  
 








φ <0. This is because the position 
of the  ) (p φ  function in the  )) ( , ( p p φ  space depends on the value ofβ  and as the value of β  
decreases, the function shifts down. Furthermore, since  ) (p φ  is a quadratic function, it will 
cut the X-axis at two points say  1 p  and  2 p  with  2 1 2
1
p p < <  as shown in figure 1. Similarly 
the function f(p) depends on the value of the R&D outlay F, and as F decreases, the function 
f(p) shifts down. This means for higher values of F, the function f(p) will intersect function 
) (p φ but for lower values of F, the function f(p) will be entirely to the left of function  ) (p φ . 
In the former case  1 p p >  and in the latter case  1 p p <  as shown in figure 1. 
 
[insert figure 1 here] 
 
When  1 p p > , it means that for all p, such that  } , max{ 1 2 p p p ≥ ≥ ,  0 ) ( ≤ p f  and 
0 ) ( ≥ p φ .  In other words in this region of high technological capabilities, in the 
neighbourhood of 1, R&D competition will be possible but an R&D cartel will be even better.  
When  1 p p < , there will be two neighbourhoods in which  0 ) ( ≤ p f  and  0 ) ( ≥ p φ . 
First, there will be a neighbourhood around  p , containing lower capabilities p such that 
1 p p p ≤ ≤  in which an R&D cartel will dominate R&D competition. Second, there is a 
neighbourhood of high capabilities p, such that  } , max{ 1 2 p p p ≥ ≥ ,where again both the 
required conditions will be satisfied.  
This completes the symmetric case.   
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Coming to asymmetric capabilities, recall that for R&D competition we must have for 













) 1 ( π π
βπ
. Again recall that an R&D cartel 
will be preferred to R&D competition, if inequality (9) is satisfied. Now when  i j p p = , 
inequality (9) is the same as condition (A.6). Therefore, by continuity of all functions 
concerned, and by the arguments described above for the symmetric case, there exists an open 
neighbourhood around  1 = = i j p p where an R&D cartel will dominate R&D competition 
and in the case of low values of F, an open neighourhood around  p p p i j = = where an R&D 
cartel will dominate R&D competition.                                                                                      
 
 
Proof of proposition 5. 
 Contrary to the statement of the proposition, suppose that the ith firm and the jth firm 
prefer the R&D cartel to a cost sharing alliance or are indifferent between them, when both 
are possible.  
Then, at the equilibrium cost sharing ratio, α*, the following inequality must hold for 
the ith firm: 
(A.7)   πr
i ≥ i
c π   
Using the definitions of πr
i and i
c π , and substituting the respective values of  α* in them, 
inequality (A.8) becomes: 
(A.8)   0 ) 2 )]( 1 ( ) 1 ( [ ≥ − − + − m d i j j i p p p p π π . 
Since  π π d m 2 >  and  0 )] 1 ( ) 1 ( [ > − + − i j j i p p p p , inequality (A.8) can never be true. 
Therefore, the converse must be true.  It must be the case that the more technologically 
capable, ith firm, prefers the cost sharing alliance to the R&D cartel, irrespective of the degree 
of asymmetry.  
Similarly, if the less capable jth firm prefers the R&D cartel to the cost sharing 
alliance, the following inequality must hold at the equilibrium cost sharing ratio, α*: 
(A.9)     πr
j≥πc
j  
Using the definitions of πr
jandπc
j and substituting the respective values of α* in 
them, inequality (A.9) can be written as:  
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Clearly, if the firms are perfectly symmetric, then inequality (A.10) will not hold, since 
0 > π . Thus, if the  jth firm is not too inefficient (or too asymmetric vis-à-vis firm i), it will 
prefer the cost sharing alliance to the R&D cartel. But, since as asymmetry increases, and the 







−  becomes increasingly greater than 1, there is a possibility that inequality 
(A.10) may hold and thus the statement of the proposition follows.                                              
 
Proof of proposition 6.  
It follows clearly from the definitions that  i r S S > . Therefore, the society prefers the 
R&D cartel to the information sharing alliance. 
Comparing  r S  and  c S  it can be shown that: 
(A.11)   ) )]( 1 ( ) 1 ( [ m d i j j i i r S S p p p p S S − − + − = −   
Since  m d S S > and  0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( > − + − i j j i p p p p , from  (A.11) it follows that  c r S S > . Therefore, 
the statement in the first part of the proposition follows. 
On the other hand, it can be seen from the definitions that since m d S S > ,  nc S  is smaller 
than either of  i c S S ,o r   r S . Therefore, the statement of the second part of the proposition 
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F  i p   j p   i c   j c   πnc
i   πnc
j   πr
i   π r
j  
50  0.9  0.9  25  25  58  58  74  74 
50  0.9  0.8  10  40  76  46  88  58 
50  0.9  0.5  0  50  130  10  95  45 
50  0.9  0.3     166  -14    
             
50  0.3  0.25  17.5  32.5  25  10  30  15 
50  0.3  0.2     28  -2    
             
50  0.55  0.3  0  50  82  7  68.5  18.5 
50  0.5  0.5  50  50  25  25  50  50 
m π = 300; 
d π = 100; 
 
Table 1 





i p   j p   πnc
i   πnc
j  
i c   j c   α   πi
i  πi
j   πc
i   πc
j   πr
i   π r
j  
0.90  0.90  58.00  58.00  25.00  25.00  0.50  49.00  49.00  83.00  83.00  74.00  74.00 
0.90  0.50  130.00  10.00  0.00  50.00  0.00  45.00  45.00  155.00  35.00  95.00  45.00 
0.90  0.30  166.00 
-
14.00                            
 
m π = 300; 
d π = 100; F =50 
Table 2 
Profit under non-cooperation and R&D cooperation 
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